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International trade dominated newspaper headlines in the fall of 1985
as the growing U.S. trade deficit and strong dollar fueled intense concern
about foreign markets closed to declining U.S. exports and rising levels
of imports, some unfairly traded, into the United States. Protectionist
congressional action seemed likely when members returned to Washington
after the August 1985 recess. Yet an aggressive international trade action
plan by the administration undercut the perceived need for legislation as
a means to solve these problems. This article outlines the major legal
issues that developed in 1985-86 regarding the administration's trade in-
itiatives, and some of the legislative issues that remain.
1. New Multilateral Trade Negotiations
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative is charged broadly with
establishing U.S. trade policy and conducting trade negotiations, in
consultation with other government agencies as appropriate. As the chief
U.S. trade negotiators, the trade representative and his staff engage in
almost continual negotiations. Bilaterally the United States never ceases
to pursue several, often many, issues with each of our major trading
partners. Multilateral trade negotiations are more intermittent, however.
Since the conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in 1947, the major developed and developing countries have
engaged in seven sets or "rounds" of such negotiations. The first six
aimed primarily to reduce tariff levels, which originally were the major
obstacles to freer trade among nations. The most recent Tokyo Round
(so-called because the meeting of trade ministers launching these ne-
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gotiations was held in Tokyo) aimed additionally to reduce nontariff
barriers to trade-such as injurious subsidies or sales at less than fair
value; discriminatory or nontransparent government procurement; ar-
bitrary customs valuation methods; and protectionist health, safety and
environmental standards.
While the Tokyo Round was helpful in reducing nontariff barriers, many
barriers and problems remain. Ideally all nations would agree on new
solutions for new problems, improved rules for old problems, and more
reliable and effective dispute settlement procedures to ensure that these
rules work. Therefore, the United States proposed a new round of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations intended to stem the worldwide tide of pro-
tectionism, liberalize further world trade conditions and practices, and
thus preserve political support for freer trade.
Initially the United States proposals garnered little support from many
of our trading partners. In particular, several developing countries op-
posed the new negotiations, especially the U.S. proposal to broaden
the GATT to cover trade in services and investment. Yet in the summer
of 1985, we prevailed in a special mail ballot-unusual in the GATT-
to convene a special session of the Contracting Parties in September
1985, in addition to the regularly scheduled ministerial meeting in No-
vember 1985. At the latter session, we obtained agreement to establish
a Preparatory Committee that would propose an agenda, objectives,
participation and modalities, with a view to beginning negotiations in
September 1986.
At a ministerial meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, the week of Sep-
tember 15, 1986, a comprehensive "Uruguay Round" of multilateral trade
negotiations was formally launched. The agenda for the negotiations ex-
pressly includes the following subjects:
" Agriculture. Pursuant to the Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay
Round, the negotiations "shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of
trade in agriculture" and to "bring all measures affecting import access
and export competition under strengthened and more operationally ef-
fective GATT rules and discipline."
" Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. The Uruguay
Round negotiations "shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate
as appropriate new rules and disciplines" regarding intellectual property.
Without prejudice to other complementary efforts that may be taken
elsewhere, the negotiations will try, for example, to develop a multi-
lateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with in-
ternational trade in counterfeit goods.
" Trade Related Investment Measures. The negotiations will elaborate,
as appropriate, any further GATT provisions necessary to avoid adverse
effects on trade of investment measures.
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" Trade in Services. Negotiations on services "shall aim to establish a
multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in services,
including elaboration of possible disciplines for individual sectors." While
these negotiations will be handled through a special negotiating group,
GATT procedures and practices will apply to these negotiations and the
group will report to the Trade Negotiations Committee, which will also
receive reports on other Uruguay Round negotiations.
" Dispute settlement. The Uruguay Round negotiation "shall aim to im-
prove and strengthen the rules and the procedures of the dispute set-
tlement process," including the development of arrangements for mon-
itoring compliance with adopted recommendations.
The ambitious agenda for the Uruguay Round also includes such items
as subsidies and countervailing measures, safeguards, natural resources,
tropical products, non-tariff measures, tariffs, Tokyo Round Codes, and
other issues. The United States thus succeeded in establishing a broad
agenda with the greatest possible likelihood of achieving significant reform
and expansion of the GATT system to facilitate freer trade. The Ministerial
Declaration calls for conclusion of the Uruguay Round within four years.
II. Canadian Trade Agreement
As already noted, trade negotiations never proceed in a single direction.
Even as new multilateral negotiations formally began, the U.S. continued
major bilateral-trade talks with Canada. As with respect to the 1984 Israeli
Free Trade Agreement, the administration would seek "fast track" leg-
islation (subject to congressional approval or disapproval only, not amend-
ment) for any such agreement. With this aim in mind, last fall the president
notified the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees of
the administration's intention to begin such discussions. The administra-
tion narrowly avoided a rejection of the fast track option by the Senate
Finance Committee, which in April came close to adopting a motion
disapproving the trade talks.
The legal issues raised in connection with these talks have been and
will continue to be extensive. For example, the legislative requirements
for eligibility for fast track congressional consideration of any such agree-
ment have been the subject of concern. Both new and longstanding dis-
putes-such as the possible countervailability of Canadian provincial
stumpage practices, and the basis for and consequences of Canadian fed-
eral rules about the acquisition of Canadian companies in cultural areas-
require legal analysis. Legal actions involving Canada-such as the unfair
trade investigation (under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974) of Ca-
nadian restrictions on the export of unprocessed salmon and herring-
will of course affect the bilateral negotiations. And existing arrangements
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between the two countries-such as the Auto Pact-may require review.
Like the New Round, this endeavor will require extensive legal advice-
not only within the two governments, but also among the international
trade bar counseling clients likely to be affected by any significant change
in the bilateral trade rules.
III. Unfair Trade Cases
In its continuing effort to combat unfair trade practices, the admin-
istration has relied increasingly this past year on domestic legal mea-
sures. An early indication of our heightened resolve to take tough action
when necessary was our retaliation against citrus tariff preferences by
the European Community for certain Mediterranean countries, that dis-
criminated against U.S. citrus exports to Europe. Unable to persuade
the EC to eliminate this discrimination that burdens U.S. commerce,
in retaliation we raised our tariffs on imports of pasta from Europe.
The aim was to show the EC and other trading partners that if they
deny us fair access to their markets, we are prepared to retaliate. While
our preference is to expand access for our exports to foreign markets,
retaliation (through closure of our market to foreign imports) must be
a credible threat to provide leverage in market access negotiations.
U.S. tariff increases on pasta imports from the EC reinvigorated this
leverage.
In the fall of 1985 and early 1986, the president himself drew attention
to the importance of free and fair trade. In addition to several speeches
on general trade policy and particular trade issues, he directed the
Trade Representative to take several unprecedented actions. First, in
September and October 1985, the president mandated initiation on the
government's own motion of investigations under section 301 of unfair
trade practices by Brazil with respect to computers and "informatics"
policies, Japan with respect to manufactured tobacco products, and
Korea with respect to insurance services and inadequate intellectual
property protection. He also directed the Trade Representative to rec-
ommend retaliation if he was unable to resolve, by December 1, long-
standing disputes with the EC on its production subsidies for canned
fruit (some of which the GATT had found to nullify or impair trade
concessions to the U.S.) and Japan on quotas for leather and leather
footwear (which the GATT had found, with respect to leather, to violate
article XI).
In March the administration again resorted to section 301, this time
in response to unfair quotas and agricultural tariff increases adopted
by the EC in connection with Portugal's and Spain's entry into the
EC. In lieu of an investigation, action (through retaliatory U.S. quotas
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and suspension of tariff concessions) was ordered unless the EC promptly
and properly compensated the U.S. for its unilateral tariff increases
and eliminated its unjustified quotas.
In addition to such historical self-initiation of investigations and actions
under section 301, the administration has also used two other legal weap-
ons. For the first time, the U.S. acted under section 307 of the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984, regarding Taiwan's export performance requirements
in the automotive sector. In approving recent Japanese automotive in-
vestments, Taiwan authorities had required the exportation of specified
percentages of the cars produced there. Because export performance re-
quirements distort trade and, in this case, were likely to result in increased
U.S. imports, the U.S. investigated the Taiwan practices. Within four
months, the U.S. concluded an agreement with Taiwan, under which the
Taiwan authorities agreed: (1) to eliminate existing export performance
requirements in the automotive sector by the summer of 1987; (2) not to
impose new such requirements; and (3) to allow existing automotive in-
vestments to be expanded without being subjected to export performance
requirements.
Moreover, for the first time the U.S. has, on its own motion, begun a
fact-finding inquiry under section 305 of the 1974 Trade Act. Although
section 305 was previously used only by private parties, at the president's
express direction, the USG has undertaken an inquiry into a directive
adopted by the European Community that could unfairly reduce U.S.
meat exports to the EC.
In December the U.S. resolved both the EC canned fruit and Japan
leather and leather footwear disputes. The EC agreed to eliminate its
canning subsidies on peaches and to reduce them on pears. While Japan
merely replaced its illegal quotas with equally objectionable tariff rate
quotas, it compensated the U.S. through tariff bindings and reductions
on other products significant to the U.S. Moreover, the U.S. also retaliated
by raising its tariffs on certain leather and leather goods imported from
Japan.
While all the other investigations and actions described above are still
pending, the administrations's historic use of these legal weapons already
has succeeded in opening foreign markets previously closed to U.S. ex-
ports. For example, in response to likely section 301 action, Korea agreed
to liberalize its motion picture distribution market. In effect, self-initiation
of 301, 305 and 307 actions, combined with vigorous pursuit of cases
begun in response to U.S. industry petitions (such as the complaint about
Japanese government semiconductor practices), has captured our trading
partners' serious attention. We have underscored our commitment to more
open markets and our resolve to retaliate if we are unable to achieve
them. By this means we have increased our negotiating leverage and,
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hopefully, the number and extent of foreign markets open to U.S. exports
of goods, services and investment.
IV. National Trade Estimates Report
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 requires the Trade Representative
annually to report to the Congress on significant barriers to U.S. exports
of goods, services and investment. In consultation with other agencies,
USTR submitted the first such report in October 1985. In his transmittal
letter, Ambassador Yeutter stressed that not all the foreign government
practices identified in the report are unfair. Some-such as high but GATT
"bound" tariffs-are expressly sanctioned by current international trad-
ing rules. Others simply are not subject to any widely agreed current
rules. Moreover, even some of the unfair practices are engaged in to some
extent by the United States as well as its trading partners.
The report serves two important purposes. First, it helps the admin-
istration set its trade negotiating priorities. Second, it helps maintain pres-
sure on the administration to pursue troublesome issues despite foreign
government intransigence or our government's intermittent preoccupation
with other bilateral issues. Once an annual report identifies a significant
foreign barrier, the administration would like to be able to herald its
elimination or at least progress toward its reduction in subsequent reports.
Careful legal review of draft reports is warranted in view of their impor-
tance and possible subsequent action involving such trade barriers under
U.S. trade laws.
V. Trade Legislation
Despite the vigor and success of the administration's trade action plan
and its execution, some in the Congress felt that still tougher action is
needed to open closed foreign markets and to protect the U.S. market
against imports that are traded unfairly or that otherwise threaten the
national security or seriously injure U.S. industry. As a result, many bills
were introduced in the 99th Congress to amend various trade laws. Com-
mon objectives of many of these bills were:
" to eliminate or reduce Presidential discretion whether to provide relief
where the International Trade Commission has found imports to be a
substantial cause of serious injury to U.S. industry;
" to eliminate Presidential discretion whether to retaliate under section
301 in response to foreign government practices that violate trade agree-
ments, or are inconsistent with other agreements and impose a burden
or restriction on U.S. commerce;
" to expand the kinds of practices that would be considered unfair under
section 301 and the countervailing duty law;
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" to make section 301 function more automatically, along the lines of the
U.S. countervailing duty and antidumping law;
" to require the president to make and report his decision in cases in-
volving alleged threats by imports to the national security;
" to require retaliation if the president, within a specified time period, is
unable to negotiate equitable access to foreign markets for telecom-
munications products;
" to reduce access to the U.S. market for imports from countries with
substantial trade surpluses with the U.S.;
" to extend existing authority to implement on a fast-track basis nontariff
barrier reductions, and to provide new authority to negotiate tariff re-
ductions; and
" to improve protection for intellectual property rights.
The administration itself proposed a separate bill to provide better
protection of intellectual property rights. However, it was unwilling to
accept any trade legislation if accompanied by objectionable amend-
ments to the trade laws. The administration could not support any of
the major omnibus trade bills in the 99th Congress.
Nonetheless, the legislative process has required, and likely will
continue to require, extensive participation by USTR lawyers. At both
hearings and committee mark-up sessions, various members seek
USTR's legal analysis of and position on bill provisions and proposals
to amend those provisions. We have also drafted letters from the Trade
Representative and other cabinet officials to members of Congress,
expressing administration positions on trade issues. Even when ulti-
mate passage of legislation appears unlikely, long working hours are
devoted to ensuring that decisions are made on an informed basis and
that the legal context and consequences of proposals are properly
appreciated.
VI. Steel Program
In September 1984 the president declined to provide relief to the U.S.
steel industry in the context of a section 201 escape clause case in which
the ITC had determined that imports of some, but not all, steel products
complained of were a substantial cause of serious injury to the U.S.
industry. Instead, because of widespread unfair steel trading practices and
the serious injury to U.S. industry, the president directed the Trade Rep-
resentative to negotiate voluntary restraint arrangements (VRAs) with
steel exporting countries. Since then the U.S. has concluded VRAs with
eighteen countries that accounted for 80 percent of all steel imports into
the U.S. Import penetration is now in the low twenty percentiles, as
opposed to over 30 percent in the third quarter of 1984. Extensive legal
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participation has been required in these negotiations to ensure precise
drafting and accurate embodiment of the intentions of the parties.
VII. Other Issues
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in general and the General
Counsel's office in particular have been absorbed in many, many other
important issues including, for example:
" Renegotiation of the Multifiber Agreement. Textile quotas in developed
countries established under the MFA are of paramount concern to de-
veloping countries that export textiles. Both the umbrella MFA and the
subsidiary bilateral agreements are highly technical and require the
greatest care in any redrafting.
" Implementation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. In 1983 the Admin-
istration obtained legislation authorizing it to provide tariff preferences
to the CBI countries. Continued implementation of this program has
involved significant tariff classification issues (such as whether certain
processing operations in CBI countries of products manufactured else-
where constitute "substantial transformation"), new benefits for CBI
textile imports, and review of the effects on this program of other de-
velopments such as enactment of the sugar provisions of the 1985 farm
bill.
" Review of the Generalized System of Preferences. As required, USTR
is reviewing the GSP program to redetermine whether certain countries
and specific products should remain eligible for duty-free treatment un-
der statutory criteria. Application of these criteria to particular facts
requires legal analysis. Inin response to congressional concern, we also
advised the Trade Representative about the inflation adjustment formula
used in calculating GSP eligibility, which some had erroneously consid-
ered to result in greater eligibility and more duty-free benefits than
warranted.
" Tokyo Round Code Committee Sessions. USTR represents the United
States in regularly scheduled meetings of the signatories to each of the
GATT Codes negotiated in the Tokyo Round. For example, we continue
to discuss injury questions and methodology for less-than-fair-value de-
terminations in the Antidumping Code Committee, and criteria for de-
termining subsidies and their countervailability in the Subsidies Code
Committee.
" Agricultural trade. Agricultural problems remain preeminent among trade
concerns. While many are handled in the context of section 301 (such
as the quotas and tariffs in connection with Portugal's and Spain's entry
into the EC), all hopefully will be addressed in the New Round. Others
are approached ad hoc in bilateral consultations, as was done with
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respect to forest products in the MOSS (market-oriented, sector specific)
talks with Japan.
Tax issues. USTR provided advice about the trade effects of various tax
reform proposals, such as the suggestion to eliminate the deduction for
tariffs paid by businesses on imports.
VIII. Conclusion
Because of widespread concern about our trade deficit and a perception
of diminishing U.S. industrial competitiveness, trade has been a major,
presidential-level issue in 1985-86. That priority is likely to continue until
the deficit substantially declines. Legal issues will likewise continue to
abound in the trade area, particularly if the number of proceedings under
U.S. trade remedy laws continues to increase and Congress remains in-
terested in possible amendment of those laws.
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